Torture and Its Malcontents by Horton, Scott
Tulsa Law Review 
Volume 45 
Issue 4 Book Review 
Summer 2010 
Torture and Its Malcontents 
Scott Horton 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Scott Horton, Torture and Its Malcontents, 45 Tulsa L. Rev. 745 (2013). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol45/iss4/16 
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by TU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Tulsa Law Review by an authorized editor of TU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please 
contact megan-donald@utulsa.edu. 
TORTURE AND ITS MALCONTENTS
Scott Horton*
Paul W. Kahn, Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty (U. Mich. Press
2010). Pp. 233. $22.95.
John T. Parry, Understanding Torture: Law, Violence, and Political Identity (U. Mich.
Press 2010). Pp. 328. $27.95.
There were broad expectations that the election of Barack Obama would mark an
end to the torture debate in America. Not only was Obama unequivocally opposed to the
torture regimen introduced by his predecessor, so were each of the three final round
candidates for the Republican nomination John McCain, Mike Huckabee, and Ron
Paul.I The issue, therefore, figured only on the margins of the 2008 presidential
campaign. Moreover, as promised, within his first forty-eight hours in the White House,
Obama issued a series of sweeping executive orders that promised to end torture and the
CIA's practice of maintaining "black site" prisons.2 He pointedly directed government
officials to place no reliance on Department of Justice opinions largely formally
rescinded by the Bush administration itself, just as it was out the door that crafted a
legally suspect platform for the use of "enhanced interrogation techniques." 3 A pledge to
close the prison operations at Guantanamo "within one year" led most press accounts.4
But Obama's pledge to close Guantinamo was not fulfilled within the deadline he
set for himself.5 Moreover, the Republican Party's turn against torture appears to have
been itself halted by the failure of electoral efforts in 2008. Strong forces within the
party, particularly figures around former Vice President Richard B. Cheney, have taken
up the theme that Obama's apparent decision to abandon torture techniques, like
waterboarding, hypothermia, and sleep deprivation over two days, puts the country at
* Lecturer in Law, Columbia Law School; contributing editor, Harper's Magazine.
1. Scott Horton, Harper's Magazine, A Vital Election-Year Initiative against Torture,
http://www.harpers.org/ archive/2008/05/hbc-90002973 (posted May 21, 2008, 1:44 p.m. EST).
2. Sara A. Carter & Eli Lake, Obama to Close Terrorist 'Black Sites', Wash. Times Al (Jan. 22, 2009).
3. U.S. Dept. of Just., Department ofJustice Releases Four Office ofLegal Counsel Opinions, http://www.
justice.gov/opalpr/2009/April/09-ag-356.html (Apr. 16, 2009).
4. See e.g. Carter & Lake, supra n. 2; Martha Neil, ABA J, Obama Seeks 120-Day Trial Delay in All
Gitmo Cases, Plans to Close Prison, http://devsite.abajoumal.com/news/article/
obama seeks 120-day trial delayin allgitmocases plans to closeprison/ (posted Jan. 21, 2009, 2:41
p.m. CDT).
5. Charlie Savage, N.Y Times, Closing Guantdnamo Fades As Priority,
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risk.6 The Obama White House has opted not to respond to the Cheney campaign,
motivated by an apparent political calculus that its interests would best be served by de-
emphasis. Instead, Obama continued President Bush's Secretary of Defense, Robert
Gates, in office and gave him broad discretion to control national defense and
intelligence-gathering policies leading to policies which generally appear, with only a
couple of narrowly defined exceptions, such as the renunciation of waterboarding and the
use of CIA black sites, to be largely in continuity with those of his predecessor.
The legal academy has developed an immense appetite for the question of torture.
Before 2001, it was a fairly obscure topic covered in some human rights and
international criminal law survey courses. But following the disclosures from Abu
Ghraib, it suddenly emerged as one of the hottest topics in the curriculum. Seminars
were oversubscribed and new textbooks published. The legal literature addressing torture
has mushroomed.
These two studies published by the University of Michigan Press are highly
complementary efforts to understand the torture debate as it emerged in the Bush era,
each working hard to place these developments in the broader context of history and U.S.
intelligence community operations, probing both the ethical and legal dimensions of the
issue.
Paul W. Kahn, the Robert W. Winner Professor of Law and the Humanities at Yale
Law School, adopts an approach that borders on the anthropological as he asks, "Does
our current interest in torture represent a turn away from a practice of consent toward one
of confession?" Kahn plows far beyond the discourse about effective human intelligence
gathering and ticking bombs, preferring instead to navigate moral, religious, and
psychological dimensions of the issue.
For liberals, torture is a medieval relic, definitively banished by Enlightenment
efforts to impose restraints on the exercise of state power in favor of personal freedoms -
or at least the physical integrity of human beings. International human rights law may
contain many limitations on state conduct that are vague and lack enforcement teeth, but
the prohibition on torture at least was viewed as absolute and beyond any further
discussion. That at least was the attitude before the American intelligence community
began resorting to some of the same tactics that American diplomats had denounced as
torture for decades when they were used by the Soviets, North Koreans, North
Vietnamese, and Chinese.
But for the authors of legal rationalizations for the Bush era's "enhanced
interrogation techniques," torture is a state-of-the-art tool for defending democracies.
They firmly believe that no tool that can save lives should be forbidden to American
interrogators, and they view claims that the use of such techniques deprives the country
of the moral high ground as idealistic nonsense.
As Kahn notes, these two sides only rarely engage one another's premises. Kahn
does an impressive job of demonstrating the limitations of the arguments employed by
both camps. But the best contributions in his book focus our attention on some matters
that have figured only on the periphery of the debate, if at all. Kahn reminds us of the
6. CNN, Chenev Says Obama's Policies 'Raise the Risk' of U.S. Terror Attack, http://www.cnn.com/20 0 9 /
POLITICS/03/15/cheney.interview/ (posted March 15, 2009, 10:58 a.m. EDT).
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existence of a space that states have created since antiquity a space to act quietly,
secretly, and outside the reach of their own law. This is of course familiar turf for
students of Carl Schmitt and Giorgio Agamben, but Kahn covers it with a virtuoso
reading of classics, most impressively with Sophocles:
A war on terror practices its own form of victory over idolatry: to disappear the enemy.
The general theme is as old as Sophocles' Antigone, which begins with the dead body of
Polynices lying outside the city's walls. The issue is whether that body will become the
object of traditional religious ritual. To leave the body unattended outside the walls-the
borders-is to leave it in an empty space where sovereign power expresses itself in death
without memory. Polynices' body expresses nothing except the power of the city to
exclude and thus make of him nothing at all. What his sister, Antigone, demands out of
respect for family and religion would, were it to be granted, simultaneously create the
7possibility of political memory.
The selection of Antigone as a basis for Kahn's discussion is telling in many ways.
It demonstrates the relationship between morality and law, the notion of a space outside
the law (which Agamben documents in much greater detail on the basis of Roman
precedents in Homo Sacer), the relationship between sacrament and politics. But it
strikes me as curious that Kahn fails to fully develop another aspect the notion of
accountability of those who wield the power of the state for their offenses against law,
religion, and morals. The decision to deny Polynices a proper funeral was taken in anger
and pettiness by a king who considered himself betrayed. The imprudence of this
decision and the need to make amends for it is a powerful theme in Sophocles's
treatment of the material we are presented with Antigone herself, presenting a well-
reasoned argument for humanity, and a chorus counseling Creon to rethink the matter in
ever more menacing tones. Sophocles was, as he wrote this piece, a general leading
troops into battle, and asserting in political dialogue conservative views about state
security. That even he would look askance upon the idea of mistreatment of a fallen
soldier who defied his government is instructive.
Still, Kahn does a fine job of pulling these threads apart before reweaving them.
"The sacred, unlike justice, exists only as an experience," he observes. The
Enlightenment taught us to view these threads morality, religious experience,
philosophy, law - as something sequential, with the religious experience merely a stage
in rationalizing morality before it was able to stand on its own legs. But Kahn reminds us
that the Enlightenment perspective is not the only one. To the contrary, the religious
dimension brings critical insights to bear on the same problem, and the liberal critique of
torture is weakened by its failure, generally, to recognize the point.
On the other side of the ledger, Kahn explores the relationship between the
American religious right and torture and sees a clear trail:
[M]ore was at stake in torture's production of the confession than the certainty that the
victim had performed an alleged criminal act. It does not take modem science or modem
sensibilities to understand that under torture someone might confess to a crime he had not
committed. Aristotle writes of this, as do Augustine and a whole succession of others.
7. Paul W. Kahn, Sacred Violence: Torture, Terror, and Sovereignty 145 (U. Mich. Press 2010).
8. Id. at 147.
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Torture was maintained not because of a failure to understand the negative epistemic value
of pain. It was pursued for reasons of faith, not fact.9
Kahn is director of the Schell Center for International Human Rights at Yale, but
he emerges in this work as a skeptic of the great human rights law project that followed
in the wake of World War II. He senses pacifist idealism lurking behind every corner - a
determination to circumscribe the state's power to wage war. He questions whether these
strictures make any sense when a state is coping with the challenges not of other states,
but rather ideologically motivated terrorists. In all of this Kahn seems curiously to
accept, without critical inspection, many of the arguments advanced by
neoconservatives, and to forget that international humanitarian law itself was born in an
historical environment filled with ideologically motivated terrorists.
More to the immediate point of the book, however, Kahn criticizes the absolute
nature of the prohibition on torture. Quoting the definition of torture from Article 1 of
the Convention Against Torture ("Convention"), Kahn observes "[i]f the definition is
read literally, combat qualifies as torture, for combat surely is the intentional infliction of
severe pain and suffering in order to intimidate or coerce." 10 He argues that the
prohibition on torture has disregarded the power of the state to wage war - " 'no torture
with no exceptions' translates into 'no war; no Exception.' "ll His conclusion: "The
autonomy of law, including the privileging of the torture prohibition, was purchased at
the cost of recognition of political reality."12
This is harsh criticism indeed, but it rests on some questionable readings of the
Convention and the laws of armed conflict. Kahn's deft wielding of concepts of moral
philosophy, literature, and history is impressive, but his discussion of international
humanitarian law is alarmingly misinformed. The notion that "combat is torture" in
particular is a dangerous blurring of concepts albeit one that was aggressively peddled
during the Bush years. Prisoners were repeatedly said to be continuing their combat
against the United States behind bars and while wearing restraints. This claim was used
to help justify the use of extraordinary techniques against them. In the view of the Bush
era apologists, the prison was just another battlefield, and the techniques used there
against the prisoners were part of an on-going struggle against an unvanquished, if
disarmed, foe. But this flies in the face of the law of armed conflict, which draws a sharp
distinction between what can be done to a foe on the battlefield and what can be done to
him after he has been seized, disarmed, and placed in confinement. A person held in
confinement is hors de combat, removed from combat. The protections against torture go
to persons who have lost their freedom, who have fallen under the power of a
government whether in a police station, a jail, a prison, or in a detention facility for
enemy prisoners seized in wartime.
Moreover, the prohibition against torturing prisoners taken in wartime is hardly a
project of post-World War II human rights law - it stretches back to the beginnings of the
modern law of war in the late eighteenth century, and was included in the first systematic
9. Id. at 26-27.
10. Id. at 59.
11. Id.
12. Kahn, supra n. 7, at 59.
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codification of the law, authored by Francis Lieber and promulgated by the Lincoln
administration in 1863.13 Kahn's notion that combat is per se torture and that the
Convention was intended as some sort of Kantian pacifist project to prohibit warfare is
pure nonsense. It would certainly be a departure from political reality to assume that the
prohibition of torture was a prohibition of warfare. Alas, the states that ratified the
Convention and implemented its provisions have not subscribed to a prohibition of war.
Still, Kahn's key insight that "the real conflict is between an ethos of love for a
particular community and a moral universalism" 14  is well maintained, as is his
downbeat conclusion that "[t]he terrorist with weapons of mass destruction may very
well put an end to our dream of a global community of human rights."'15
By comparison, John Parry's book, Understanding Torture, carries a stronger
focus on torture as a matter of practice and law over the last century. Although Parry
launches his book with a discussion of the Bush administration's torture memoranda, his
scope is broader. "Law will likely fail when it seeks to regulate state violence, of which
torture is a central, but hardly singular, example."' 6 He discounts the notion that law
alone can provide the necessary force to ban torture - and certainly the celebrated Office
of Legal Counsel memoranda by John Yoo, Jay Bybee, and Steven G. Bradbury would
appear to back up his conclusions. But so does Parry's in-depth review of international,
European, and U.S. law dealing with state violence.
Parry's review of jurisprudence from the European Court of Human Rights is
clear-eyed and offers a careful attention to the political consequences of decisions as
opposed simply to discussion of legal doctrine. He concludes that it "tends to efface state
responsibility for torture." 17 This remark is warranted by the jurisprudence of the 1970s
and 1980s, but the more recent cases, especially those involving Russia and Turkey,
point to a far less forgiving posture. Parry presents insightful reviews of France during
the Algerian conflict, Britain in its colonial war in Kenya and suppression of the troubles
in Ireland, Spain in its efforts to suppress Basque separatists, and finally Israel in its
struggle with the Intifada. Each of these case studies does indeed bear out his thesis.
Much of this ground has been worked by earlier writers, notably by Darius Rejali, but
Parry worked in interesting new detail and succeeded in finding common threads that
link the experiences - particularly those of colonial powers.
By contrast, Parry's discussion of the experience of the Bush years is weaker and
contains some irritating mistakes. Reviewing the process through which harsh techniques
were introduced by the military, for instance, he states that "the request went up the
traditional chain of command, from people in the field to highest levels of the military
and their political superiors." But Philippe Sands demonstrated very persuasively in
The Torture Team that the appearance of a bottom-up request was a sham; in fact the
need for the new techniques was settled upon within a high level of political actors, and a
13. See Yale Law School, The Avalon Project: Documents in Law, History, and Diplomacy,
http://avalon.law. yale.edu/19th century/lieber.asp (last accessed Oct. 8, 2010).
14. Kahn, supra n. 7, at 88.
15. Id. at 178.
16. John T. Parry, Understanding Torture: Law, Violence, and Political Identity 13 (U. Mich. Press 2010).
17. Id at 93.
18. Id. at 183.
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request was then carefully staged. 19 Similarly, Parry concludes that "although Rumsfeld
certainly expanded the methods available to military interrogators, he did not go as far as
the CIA."20 This would be true if the only action Rumsfeld took was the celebrated
December 2002 order. But it is clear that apart from this order, which addressed only
conditions at Guantanamo, other orders were issued under special-access programs
which authorized the use of techniques like those used by the CIA in Afghanistan and
Iraq. Even with respect to the Guantanamo operations, however, things are not so clear
as Parry portrays them. For instance, he notes the standard operating procedures
introduced by General Geoffrey Miller: "The standard operating procedures confirm that
the exceptional space of Guantanamo was not lawless."21 Subsequently leaked, the SOPs
authorized a number of highly abusive practices, but they were also carefully delimited
to apply only within the perimeters of Camp America. In other words, they did not apply
in the CIA-operated facilities inside the Guantanamo enclave but just outside of Camp
America, the site of three mysterious prisoner deaths in June 2006, among other things.
In the final pages, Parry refers to the use of "stress positions and waterboarding" at
Guantanamo.22 But the Bush administration insists that only three prisoners were
waterboarded and that the waterboarding occurred at CIA black sites, and it fervently
denies that any prisoners were waterboarded at Guantanamo.23 But viewed in its entirety,
Parry's book captures the essence of the Bush administration practices and draws well-
justified conclusions about them.
The current state of the law opens more space for coercive conduct. Torture may
not be legitimate, but cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment seems to be. Some of this
is expected to change under the Obama administration, but the anticipated retrenchment
may not be as thorough as many people hope, and to the extent that some of this change
happens through executive orders, it will further entrench ideas of executive control over
detention and immigration policy.
Kahn and Parry are joined in an appreciation of the difficulty of asking the state to
impose upon itself a limitation on the use of certain forms of violence, or to demand
accountability for infractions of the law that were sanctioned by political actors at the
highest level. The torture debate is likely to be with us for some time to come.
19. See Philippe Sands, Torture Team: Rumsfeld's Memo and the Betrayal of American Values (Palgrave
Macmillan 2008).
20. Parry, supra n. 16, at 183.
21. Id. at 186.
22. Id at 210.
23. See Randall Mikkelsen, Reuters, CIA Says Used Waterboarding on Three Suspects,
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN05191813 (posted Feb. 5, 2008, 6:50 p.m. EST); Paul Reynolds, BBC
News, Report Claims CIA Used Torture', http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7945 7 83.stm (last updated Mar.
16, 2009, 16:17 GMT).
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